Introduction

1
The Chinese government established its first national public assistance scheme -the 2 Urban Minimum Living Standard Scheme (UMLSS) -in 1997 following its economic 3 reforms in the late 1970s. The scheme is especially important to tackle the economic 4 hardship of laid-off workers caused by a large scale reform on state-owned-enterprises 5 (Zhang, 2012) . According to the State Council (1997) , the UMLSS helped maintain 6 social stability and facilitated the economic reform. Accordingly, poor families can 7 apply for UMLSS if their incomes are below a region's poverty threshold. After seeing 8 the success of the UMLSS, the Chinse government introduced the Rural Minimum 9 Living Standard Scheme (RMLSS) in 2007 in order to address the financial needs of 10 formers after the abolition of collective production teams and the consequences of 11 illegal land acquisitions. 12 13 However, there are increasingly concerns on welfare dependency, which has been 14 assumed to be caused by 'generous' UMLSS assistance. The public's anxiety has been 15 aroused by mass media's reports and further confirmed by academic research studies. 16 Zhou (2012) conducted a content analysis on newspaper articles published in the most 17 authoritative publication of the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) from 1998 to 2011. 18 She found that 63% of the themes of the articles were about 'tightening means testing 19 and increasing home visits' and 23% were about 'tackling welfare dependency & work 20 disincentives'. For example, the following commentary portrayed UMLSS 21 beneficiaries as 'lazy people': 22 3 
The 'golden content' of the UMLSS welfare is so high that it will create 2 beneficiaries who find it 'hard to quit' or will even 'raise lazy people'. Some 3 beneficiaries are reluctant to quit the UMLSS even after their incomes increase 4 and their situations improve. A minority of beneficiaries are normal in health and 5 intelligence, but they are keen to 'lie down and eat' the UMLSS welfare.
[They] 6 refuse to 'stand on their own two feet' but depend on the UMLSS benefits and 7 additional welfare. (Global Times, 2013) 8 9 Chinese policy makers are also concerned the welfare dependency and have attempted 10 to use welfare-to-work measures to drive welfare claimants to the labour market (Ngok, 11 Chan & Peng, 2012). For example, Guangzhou city requires able-bodied beneficiaries 12 to perform unpaid community services for 3.5 days a week since 2005, including 13 picking up rubbish in streets, neighborhood patrols and directing traffic on roads. The 14 benefits of the UMLSS recipients will be terminated if they fail to perform these duties 15 twice a month. 16 
17
The fears of the public and policy-makers are further supported by a number of 18 academic studies, which reported that the payments for UMLSS recipients are too 19 generous. By using indicators of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 20 Liu and Lin (2015) defined 'welfare dependency' as the level of UMLSS benefits is 21 more than 50% of the total household income. Based on data gathered in ten provinces claimant who is on benefit for more than 20 months. Liu and Lin (2015)'s study showed 5 that 96% of the Chinese households living on the UMLSS had never left the institution 6 and 85% had been claiming the benefits for more than two years. Other studies reported 7 a low work motivation among the UMLSS claimants. Han and Guo (2012) examined 8 1,209 UMLSS beneficiaries in six cities in 2007. For recipients with a work capacity, 9 the level of benefit was one of the significant factors predicting their possibility in 10 finding jobs. For every increase of 100 yuan of benefit, this would decrease their 11 possibility in getting jobs by 4%. In short, the mass media's portray and some academic 12 studies have generated an impression that public assistance beneficiaries can rely on 13 'generous' benefits to live a relatively 'comfortable' life. 14 15 On the other hand, some argue that the levels of UMLSS are actually too low to provide 16 poor recipients with a decent living, not to mention to reduce their work motivation. 17 The ratio of the average UMLSS thresholds to per-capita consumption in urban areas 18 significantly declined during 1999-2007 and they only returned to 22% in 2009 (Gao 19 and Zhai, 2012). Also in a declining trend, the level of the UMLSS thresholds was only 20 16% of the mean disposable income in urban China in 2010, while the same indicator 21 in Sweden was 35% (Gustafsson and Gang, 2013 ). This study aims to contribute to the above debate on whether the UMLSS has created 2 welfare dependency in China. The first section of this article will review explanations 3 on welfare dependency, which also will be used to analyse the case of China. Then, it 4 will elaborate the intentions of the Chinese authoritarian state on the 'minimum living 5 standard'. After that, the scope of the 'minimum living standard' will be assessed in two 6 ways: one is to compare the UMLSS thresholds in 1999-2014 to the World Bank's (WB) 7 absolute standards and the 'cost of basic needs' (CBN) standards; while the other is to 8 use the life experiences of UMLSS beneficiaries in Guangzhou to illustrate the levels 9 of assistance and explain why poor people are difficult to leave the public assistance 10 scheme. Finally, this article will argue that due to the inability of the beneficiaries to 11 purchase health, housing and education services, supplementary benefits attached to the 12 status of UMLSS claimants is the main cause contributing to the dependency of poor 13 people. 14 
15
Explaining Welfare Dependency 16 17 Welfare dependency has been widely debated in many Western countries. There are two 18 conflicting approaches explaining its causes, including 'advocates who support 19 cultural/behavioral arguments and those who support structural/economic arguments' 20 (Jordan, 2004: 18) . Behavioral and cultural explanations argue that individual problems, 21 family and neighborhood culture as well as rational choice lead poor people to live on 22 6 public benefits. This perspective was especially popular in the US from 1960s to 1980s. Policy 1950 Policy -1980 Policy (1984 were regarded as 'Reaganite Bibles' (White, 3 2001: 224). According to Murray (1984) , family breakdowns and worklessness were 4 caused by the US's attractive welfare system, which 'feeds the growth of the underclass, 5 by making it too easy for lone mothers to rear children, and removing the pressure on 6 single mothers to marry'. The culture of the underclass, which rejected the family and 7 work ethics of the mainstream society, was a 'disease' that was spread by people and 8 contaminated the life of entire neighborhoods (Murray, 1984) . Murray further suggested 9 that poor people were rational actors, who chose to live on a comfortable welfare life 10 but refused to work (Jordan, 2004 20 Thus, he proposed the reduction of state benefits in order to tackle the negative 21 consequences of the welfare system. It seems that there is a resurgence of the above ideas in both US and UK in recent years. 2 Barnichon and Figura (2016) stated that changes on welfare and social insurance in the 3 1990s had lowered the desire to work by 50 percent. The anti-poverty reforms 4 introduced by Democrats were criticized for reducing work motivation 'since people 5 implicitly calculate the costs and benefits of productive behavior' (Mitchell, 2015) . 6 Therefore, any welfare improvements are undesirable as they will adversely affect 7 employment. As Mulligan put it, 'The more you help low-income people, the more low-8 income people you'll have. The more you help unemployed people, the more 9 unemployed people you'll have' (quoted in Mitchell, 2015) . 10 11 In order to tackle welfare dependency and enhance public assistance recipients' work 12 motivations, accessing to benefits have been made conditional over the past two 13 decades. Social policy debates have 'shifted from the causes of poverty to the details of 14 work requirements' (Brezina, 2008 : 26) such as job search activities, relevant training 15 courses, work placements, and unpaid community work. 16 17 In the UK, comprehensive workfare measures have been implemented since the New 18 Labour Government in 1997. The UK's Coalition Government pointed that that more 19 than 'one in four working-age adults in the UK do not work' and as many as 2.6 million 20 of the population spent 'at least half of the last 10 years on some form of out-of-work 21 benefit' (Department for Work & Pensions, 2010: 9). Thus, its benefit reforms aimed at On the other hand, some argue that poverty is caused by economic and 'several 12 interrelated institutional environments' based on gender, class, or race (Jordan, 2004: 13 22 ). According to a study, the two main causes of poverty were 'family composition 14 changes' (eg, death or divorce) and 'labour market events' (e.g. job loss) (Corcoran, et 15 al, 1985: 532) . In recent years, in-work poverty is an important explanation of 16 contemporary poverty as low wages means that 'employment is no longer a guaranteed 17 passport away from poverty' (Shildrick & Rucell, 2015: 5) . In short, the welfare 18 dependency of poor people needs to be analysed in the context of the economic 19 problems of capitalism and some social changes that are beyond a person's control. 20 21 Welfare reforms over the past three decades in Western societies aim to address 22 9 concerns over welfare trap. The welfare trap theory assumes that taxation policies and 1 welfare benefits can keep claimants on social security system because 'the withdrawal 2 of means tested benefits that comes with entering low-paid work causes there to be no 3 significant increase in total income' (Bowman & Kearney, 2007) . It seems that welfare 4 trap can be explained by either personal choice or poor people's constraints in a market 5 economy. Some might argue that welfare beneficiaries will calculate the benefits of 6 living on public assistance and refuse to take up jobs. On the other hand, some might 7 put out that low wages and expensive housing, medical treatments, education force 8 welfare recipients to maintain their status as public assistance claimants in order to gain 9 access to basic necessities that are essential to human well-being. 10 
11
Against the above debates on poverty and welfare trap, the following sections will 12 firstly examine the level of UMLSS to see whether it is too attractive to create welfare 13 dependency as suggested by liberal economic followers such as Murray and Gilder.
14 Then, qualitative data from a research study in Guangzhou city will be used to further 15 explore whether welfare trap plays a role in contributing to the welfare dependency of 16 MLSS beneficiaries, who had to rely on their public assistance status in order to access 17 basic social services. 18 
19
The Level of 'Minimum Living Standard': From Official Concept to 20 
International Standards
21
Free market followers argue that welfare dependency is an outcome of generous public 22 assistance benefits. This section will examine whether the level of China's MLSS is too 1 high to reduce claimants' work motivation. The discussion will start from the Chinese 2 government's interpretation of the concept of 'minimum living standard'. Then, level 3 of the UMLSS will be examined by two international poverty measurements -WB and 4 CBN standards. 5 6 After the economic reform was initiated in 1978, China was compelled to substitute 7 danwei or workplace-based welfare with an overarching social security system. High-8 ranking leaders, however, have been extremely cautious about the standards of this 9 social security system. As early as 1980, Deng Xiao-ping (1980) rejected the idea of 10 'welfare state' in China because in his belief, 'development of production' should be 11 prioritised over 'improving people's living standards' by state welfare. 12 13 We are fundamentally poor and weak, with under-development of education, 14 science and culture. We oppose the argument for creating a welfare state in China 15 because it is impossible. We can only improve our living standards gradually on 16 the basis of developing production. It is wrong to develop production without 17 raising people's living standards, but it is also wrong -in fact impossible -to 18 improve people's living standards without developing production. 19 20 This rationale about the social security system deeply influenced the development of 21 the UMLSS. Since its establishment, the authorities have been very alert to the The key is to confirm the UMLSS thresholds and the benefits of recipients at a 4 reasonable level. A high level would not only lead to the over-burdening of the 5 state but also produce a system for 'raising lazy people', which would undermine 6 the possibility of employment. 7 8 According to Duoji (2001: 87) , a former government minister who was responsible for 9 establishing the UMLSS, the guidance for setting the UMLSS thresholds should stick 10 to the principle of 'moving up from low levels'. This means that 'levels of the UMLSS 11 should be lower than incomes from work in order to prevent the problem of raising lazy 12 people through the UMLSS' (Duoji, 2001: 85) . He worried that, 'Otherwise, those 13 people with the ability to work would not fulfill their obligations but only settle for an 14 easy life' (Duoji, 2001: 86 yuan, was only 1.64 times as much as the '$1.25 a day' standard (3,000 yuan). indicates that the living conditions of UMLSS beneficiaries are even worse than that of 12 the prisoners in China, whose nutritional intake was set at 3,343 kilo calories/day 1 (Wang, 1998 Qualitative Data on the Level of UMLSS 13 The findings from the two international measurements have demonstrated that the level 14 of UMLSS was actually very low that only offered a minimal amount of support for 15 poor people. Based on interview data from welfare officers and UMLSS recipients, this 16 section will explore the life experiences of those who were living on public assistance 17 and analyse why they could not leave the benefit system. 18 19 The research site of this study was in Guangzhou and the fieldwork was conducted from 20 June to September 2010 when the monthly UMLSS was 410 yuan, the third highest 21 level in the 36 central cities in China. This means that the life experiences of struggling 22 19 for subsistence at the relatively higher standard of threshold for Guangzhou are very 1 likely to be found in other cities with much lower. There were two categories of 2 respondents, including 12 UMLSS recipients and 8 welfare workers. Among the 3 welfare workers, 5 were from street offices (SO) and 3 from residents' committees (RC). 4 In China, SOs are the lowest level government agency that are responsible for 5 administrating UMLSS applications. RCs are semi-official neighborhood organisations, 6 which have long been treated as the government's foot-soldier, helping various 7 government agencies to provide a wide range of public services such as community 8 health education, neighborhood safety, national birth control, and, over the past twenty 9 years, assisting UMLSS applications before sending all relevant materials to the RCs. 10 The workers of the SOs are also expected to visits UMLSS applicants to investigate 11 their applications. 12 13 In China, welfare claimants are suspicious to the authority and are unlikely to openly 14 express their views on the UMLSS for fear of upsetting government officials. In order 15 to reduce the resistance of the respondents and also gathered data that could truly 16 illustrate the actual experiences of poor people, this study adopted a 'snowball' 17 approach; respondents were therefore recruited through one of the author's private 18 connections as well as referred by some of the respondents. All stakeholders, including 19 5 workers from RCs and 3 workers from SOs, were referred to this study by the author's 20 former colleague who had close contacts with government officials because of research 21 studies. 
11
Beneficiaries living on the UMLSS 'must find every means to survive' (Ms. Pan), such 12 as searching for the lowest prices, buying the minimal amount of food or slowing down 13 consumption. 14 15 Four claimants had tried different means to reduce food bills such as buying cheap food 16 in another area, getting reduced products just before the closing of stores and cooking 17 several meals in a single time. Three examples are as follows: 18 19 Vegetables are usually sold at 3.5 yuan/500 grams. I can only afford an amount 20 worth 1 yuan. And I have to cook them separately for several days (Ms. Shu). 21 22 21 In order to save fuel, I cook lunch and supper at the same time. My tip for saving 1 on food is to buy a whole chicken and cut it into small pieces. By doing this, I can 2 eat the chicken for a month (Ms. Zhou). 3 4 I cook two meals at a time and I will finish the leftovers the next morning. In order 5 to save more money on meals, I ride a bicycle to a market in another district, which 6 takes me 1.5 hours (Mr. Zhao). The UMLSS claimants also found it difficult to pay for utilities bills. Some of them 9 even did not use basic household appliances such as microwave, air conditioner and 10 electric shower. The following two respondents described how they reduced electricity 11 consumption in their daily life: 12 13 You may notice that there is a television and an air conditioner in the apartment. The life experiences of beneficiaries further demonstrate how deprived they were of 22 22 social participation. It is very common for beneficiaries to 'seldom go out for shopping 1 and have dinner at a restaurant' (Mr. Li) or 'never have any social engagements' (Mr. In short, the 'minimum living standard' of UMLSS thresholds had excluded 12 beneficiaries from the mainstream society in terms of food consumption and social life. 13 Living in a life of social deprivation, one respondent hoped that he could 'return to 14 mainstream society' (Mr. Li). 15 16 'Trapped' in the UMLSS 17 The quantitative and qualitative data presented in previous sections have demonstrated 18 that financial support for UMLSS recipients is too low to cultivate a dependency culture. nearly twice as much as for the median income group (Chen et al., 2010 ). 16 17 It should be stressed that many people claimed for UMLSS because of health reasons. In order to reduce the welfare burden of poor people, local governments set up various 3 types of schemes to address their medical, housing, and education needs. UMLSS 4 beneficiaries are the largest welfare group which can access these services. For example, 5 UMLSS beneficiaries in Guangzhou can reimburse most of the expenses on 6 hospitalisation or some special out-patient services. Beneficiaries also can apply for 7 low-rent apartments which only charge one yuan per square metre. As for education, 8 their children can be exempted from all fees related to compulsory education and also 9 can receive subsidies and student loans in higher education. The UMLSS beneficiaries 10 of our study emphasized that these supplementary benefits had unable them to solve 11 their basic needs: 12 13 We only need to pay one yuan/square metre for our current apartment. We could 14 not find such a cheap apartment if we left the UMLSS. (Ms. Zhuo) 15 16 As long as we are recognised as beneficiaries, we can live in this low-rent Other than benefits, medical aid and low-rent apartments are becoming more and 13 more important. People are greedy. They think that they have 'rights' to these 14 provisions. Instead of self-reliance, they will try every means to pursue the 15 UMLSS welfare that the government is currently providing for them. 16 17 On the other hand, the reluctance of the beneficiaries leave UMLSS can be explained 18 by their difficulties in purchasing basic welfare provisions in the market. This was 19 illustrated from the negative experiences of Ms Xian and Ms Zhang following their 20 leaving of the UMLSS. Having been claiming the UMLSS for more than seven years, 21 Ms Xian's family finally escaped from the UMLSS in early 2010 because she and her I wish I had understood the policy better before leaving the UMLSS. We sincerely 6 hope that the state can go on helping us. Otherwise, our situation will not become 7 better even though we seem to have more income than before. The rent in the same 8 area is at least 40 yuan per square metre! 9 10 Similarly, Ms. Zhang's family managed to leave the UMLSS because her husband 11 started to claim his pension with about 2,000 yuan per month. She also worked as a 12 part-time domestic helper with a monthly income of 800 yuan. However, she was 13 regretting their 'honest' decision to leave the UMLSS: 14 15 Even with my husband's pension, I am still feeling stressed about his medical bills. 16 Now we can't claim reimbursement for all the costs as we did before. We also need 17 to raise money for my daughter's tuition fee. This apartment is the same size as the 18 previous low-rent apartment, but the price is tripled to 1500 yuan a month. We have 19 been so honest in leaving the UMLSS once our incomes increased. But we may be 20 as poor as before if all these expenses are considered. This means that we actually 21 never get out of poverty. The subsidy from the UMLSS doesn't matter. What matters is this low-rent 7 apartment, reimbursement for the treatment to my eye and financial support for 8 the university tuition fees for my children. I know some people will call us 'lazy 9 people', but how can we manage these expenses if we are only earning 800 10 yuan/month in the market? 11 12 The above cases have clearly demonstrated that poor income families in China are kept 13 in the public assistance scheme because of their difficulties in affording housing, 14 medical care and education in the open market. It is only through their UMLSS 15 claimants' status that the basic welfare needs can be met. 16 
17
Conclusion
18
This study examines whether China's public assistance is too attractive to create welfare 19 dependency and analyses the nature of welfare trap in its public assistance system. 20 The findings from the international measurements on assistance level have confirmed 21 that China's UMLSS assistance thresholds can hardly motivate beneficiaries to 'depend' 22 29 on its public assistance system. Subordinated to the Chinese government's priorities on 1 economic development, the UMLSS thresholds have been made only the minimal level. 2 As a top official put it, this means the 'minimum needs of the poor population for 3 avoiding hunger and cold' (Duoji, 1997: 253) or 'basic survival conditions for poverty-4 stricken families' (Zhu, 2000) . Compared to the WB standard of '$1.25 a day', the 5 'minimum living standard' of UMLSS thresholds during 1999-2009 was only 6 equivalent to the poverty lines of the poorest countries in the world. Moreover, the 7 UMLSS thresholds from 1999 to 2012 worked out by using the CBN method showed 8 that the assistance levels could only allow beneficiaries to live on food with cheapest 9 prices, while the non-food costs were not properly included. 10 11 Moreover, the analysis of the subjective experiences of beneficiaries reported in this 12 study shows that their reluctance to leave the UMLSS was associated with supplement 13 benefits that allow them to access basic housing, medical and education services. 
